Displaying items by tag: iran

The case of MCS Technologies – did Iran use a German factory for illicit procurement?

2015-08-19T09:59:20+00:00

Proliferation Case Study Series: The Nuclear Mechanic

2015-08-18T12:35:07+00:00

20150815_-_The_Nuclear_Mechanic.pdf

New Project Alpha report: The AEOI Files

2015-08-10T13:22:01+00:00

Russia releases full text of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

2015-07-13T23:00:00+00:00

Project Alpha in The Telegraph: Is Saudi Arabia seeking nuclear weapons?

2015-05-26T23:00:00+00:00

An Architecture for Controlling Nuclear-related Trade with Iran

2015-04-19T23:00:00+00:00

Firstly, if an agreement is to remain in place, the E3+3 must ensure that Iran’s legitimate nuclear technology needs, as allowed for under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and agreed under the JCPoA, are satisfied.

Secondly, procurement by Iran of goods outside the dedicated procurement channel could indicate that Iran is not complying with the terms of the agreement (and therefore construe non-compliance). This concern directly relates to the scope of Iranian nuclear development over the past two decades, in which illicit trade is widely acknowledged to have played a central role, as exemplified in several of Project Alpha’s case studies. Countering such trade remains of crucial importance for the successful implementation of the JCPoA. However, the US text provides only an outline to address these issues: Several issues need to be resolved, including whether Iran can stockpile nuclear-related goods beyond the needs envisaged under the JCPoA by buying items through the procurement channel, whether the procurement channel will monitor and control nuclear-sensitive items intended for non-nuclear uses, and what items and technologies should be controlled (this issue presents additional challenges, since existing UN sanctions on Iran that restrict transfers with potential nuclear and missile related uses relate to partially outdated lists of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)).

Thirdly, there is a possibility that Iran could clandestinedly seek nuclear-related goods for its ballistic missile programme (something that is not inconceivable because of certain overlaps between the lists of the NSG and the MTCR). The prospect of such procurement is particularly challenging as it could void the nuclear agreement altogether. Detecting and responding to these eventualities lies at the core of designing a successful procurement channel architecture. This is based on the assumption that no one body (such as the IAEA) can implement the procurement channel on its own.

It be summarised as follows:

1) A Security Council resolution should be adopted to create an architecture that enables implementation and enforcement of the procurement channel and measures to respond to possible non-compliance.

2) The resolution should create a Security Council Committee to oversee implementation of the resolution and Group of Experts to assist the Committee, which would be tasked with investigatory and technical responsibilities and remain independent from their respective governments.

3) The mandate for the Committee should include: authorising transfers for nuclear end uses in accordance with the terms of any agreement; monitoring transfers of controlled dual-use items to non-nuclear ends as authorised by individual states; investigating possible instances of non-compliance (including interdicted shipments in third party countries).

4) This Committee should have the authority to create and maintain lists of technologies that cannot be exported to Iran without authorisation by the exporting state in line with the process described herein.

5) This Committee should be charged with monitoring any remaining sanctions, including with regards to conventional arms transfers and ballistic missile proliferation.

6) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be tasked with confirming on behalf of the Committee that a need exists for any transfer of controlled goods for a nuclear end use and for periodically confirming that procured goods (or indigenously produced items) have not been diverted to unauthorised nuclear end uses in Iran. Under its current mandate, its relationships with member states, as well as technical capabilities, the IAEA cannot operate the procurement channel on its own. While the use of national intelligence to investigate the end uses/users of imported commodities poses significant challenges in the current climate, the IAEA’s fact-checking and investigatory role should provide part of the overall verification regime for controlling nuclear-related commerce.

7) The role of the E3+3 (P5+1) grouping would remain consultative and be restricted to dispute resolution on issues brought to it either by individual states (including Iran) or as referrals by the Committee.

In addition, issues of non-compliance on the trade-related provisions of the JCPoA could likely fall into two main categories:The first relates to attempts to procure goods from outside the authorised channel for nuclear end use in Iran. Since 2010, investigations on this issue have been undertaken by a Panel of Experts working under the supervision of the UNSC’s Sanctions Committee. It is recommended that they continue to be the responsibility of the UN Panel of Experts, which would be improved by access to information from within Iran. In more practical terms, the IAEA should be tasked with providing support to the Group of Experts in terms of conducting field verification in Iran given that IAEA already has ‘boots on the ground’. The second category of non-compliance relates to diversion of nuclear-relevant goods procured through the channel. Any such diversion should be monitored by the IAEA, since it is the body that is already tasked with investigating the correctness and completeness of Iran’s safeguards declarations, as well as monitoring the storage of certain nuclear-related materials. Monitoring the end uses of procured goods is thus a natural extension of the IAEA’s mandate. A further consideration in both circumstances is the possibility that nuclear-related goods could be destined for Iran’s ballistic missile programme, which the US text states will continue to be subject to UN sanctions. As nuclear-related goods also have missile-related end uses, any continuation of illicit trade in nuclear-related goods would be the responsibility of the Group of Experts under the presented architecture. The Group would also be charged with considering whether the goods were destined for a nuclear or missile related end use, with any uncertain cases sent to the dispute resolution body.

Historical insights and an understanding of the mandates and capabilities of various international bodies were utilised when devising this architecture. Nonetheless, further discussion of the proposed architecture should take place ahead of the 20 June 2015 drafting deadline of the JCPoA.

The full paper can be downloaded at the link below.

iran-proc-channel-in-template-final-v2-3.pdf

Project Alpha and Association of University Legal Practitioners issue export control guidance for academia

2015-04-06T23:00:00+00:00

This document has been prepared with support from the UK's Export Control Organisation and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The purpose of the document is to provide a comprehensive yet accessible guide for university practitioners on the export control legislation applicable in the UK and the Academic Technology Approval Scheme (Student Vetting Scheme) which are separate but complementary regimes. This document also contains tools prepared by Project Alpha and AULP members, including policy statements, flowcharts and questionnaires, that can be used by university staff to determine if those controls affect them and how to manage compliance. No specific change in legislation or policy prompted the preparation of this guide.

Who is this document for?

This Guide is specifically targeted at university vice chancellors, legal and compliance departments, research support teams and technology transfer offices. It includes suggested templates for working with individual academics and researchers involved in academic disciplines affected by non-proliferation-related controls, particularly engineering and science fields since it is these areas that are most likely, but not exclusively, to be affected by Export Controls.

Ideally, awareness and guidance on Export Controls should form an integral part of an academic institution’s research policies and guidance on good practice in research.

Context Controls over strategic goods or technology (collectively referred to as “Export Controls”) have been enacted in the UK for decades, with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) provisions in relation to transfers of technology or technical assistance being in place from at least 2004. Equally all EU countries are required to maintain a system of end-use export and transfer controls. By international law, all countries which are members of the UN have been required since 2004 to maintain a system of Export Controls in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This requirement affects not just commercial entities, but applies to all entities (commercial or non-commercial) including universities and researchers that might ‘export’.

The collective implications of these commitments and obligations is that in some cases individual academics in a university may need an export licence from the Export Control Organisation to carry out an activity - failure to obtain one being a criminal offence.

NOTE: This document is for guidance only. It is NOT a statement of law. Before carrying out any activity subject to strategic controls (exports, transfers of technology, provision of technical assistance, etc.) you should refer to the legal provisions in force at the time.

The Tool Kit:

A Decision Tree adapted for local circumstances would help academics make an initial assessment about whether the rules apply and what needs to be done. An institution’s decision tree might be along the following lines:

If you answer “yes” to any of the following questions, take advice:-

Question 1) Was the technology imported from the US? Universities should be aware that in some instances controls from other territories may apply in addition to UK-administered controls. This is particularly common for US technologies, where re-export clauses often apply which prevent not only the goods, software or technology being re-exported to particular countries, but also can prevent it being transferred to or shared with foreign nationals within the UK.

If the technology is subject to ITAR or EAR this may affect exporting and also sharing with researchers within the institution who are from overseas or have dual nationality. These rules need to be satisfied, as well as UK export control requirements. But do not forget to consider UK Export Controls also.

Question 2) The Technology: The primary question that must be answered is whether it appears on the Export Control list. The ECO offers a range of services to help with the process of classification to determine whether the technology is listed. There are three key points to establish here:

Firstly: Is the item or technology specifically designed for military or nuclear end uses?

Secondly: Does the export include encryption software or hardware?

Finally: Do you need to check the UK controlled list of military or dual use items?

Question 3) End use controls: Who are you working with?

The end use controls look at who the end user is and what the end use is. The following list of questions may help you establish an end use or end user issue that you need to look into further.

Even if the item, technology or software is not listed in the UK Consolidated Lists, a licence could also be required if the exporter knows, has been informed or suspects there is a WMD end use.

Question 4) Sanctions

Additional restrictions can apply when dealing with countries that are subject to sanction. These can include restrictions on the actions of individuals and entities, including their ability to travel or to use financial systems, and they can include additional restrictions on exports or trade activities, which often have the effect of broadening the UK Consolidated Lists to include items which would not normally be included in the UK Consolidated List.

Two flow charts are offered:

1. Basic awareness – to help researchers understand if they need to know more about Export Control. (Note: This flowchart does not ask researchers whether their goods are controlled. It is intended for use as an awareness raising tool only.)

2. When do the UK Consolidated Lists need to be considered?

This second flow chart on the following page links and cross references to the proposed Decision Tree. "Controlled" as used in this flow chart means the technology is on either

• The Consolidated Military and Dual Use Lists or

• Any Sanctions List

The document can be downloaded at the link below.

Guidance for Academia on Export Controls

Monitoring the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1 – Five Key Points

2015-04-03T23:00:00+00:00

According to this document, certain of Iran’s nuclear activities are subject to monitoring for periods ranging from 10 to 25 years. Iran also implements the IAEA's Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1, both enhanced safeguards measures. Iran in addition agrees to measures to address additional concerns, such as those related to the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of Iran’s nuclear programme.

The details of the JCPoA need to be agreed by 30 June 2015, and State Department officials, lacking an imaginative original caveat, highlight that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”. Nevertheless the 2 April accord will undoubtedly go down in history as an impressive achievement. The negotiators deserve congratulations.

But because of Iran’s history of deception regarding its nuclear programme, skeptics (not least The Economist) suggest “distrust and verify” should be the watchwords. So how in practice will the JCPoA as described in the State Department document be monitored, and if necessary enforced?

There appear to be five key points for consideration:

The document states that a new UN Security Council resolution will lift all existing Security Council resolutions on Iran, simultaneous with completion by Iran of actions addressing all key concerns: enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD and transparency. What does “addressing” mean in practice, and who will decide that “addressing” is sufficient to justify a new Security Council resolution to lift all UN Security Council sanctions? For example, will Iran really provide sufficient information to the IAEA to resolve all outstanding concerns on PMD by 30 June?
The document states that core provisions of existing UN Security Council resolutions (i.e. those addressing transfers of sensitive technologies and activities) will be re-established by a new UN resolution which will also incorporate restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions for cargo inspections and asset freezes. How in practice will existing UN Security Council provisions regarding Iran’s ballistic missile activities, and restrictions on conventional arms transfers to or from Iran be modified? Will for example paragraph 5 of resolution 1747 (2007), that prevents transfers by Iran of arms or related material, be modified? What monitoring mechanisms will be incorporated into the resolution for the JCPoA as a whole?
The document states that the resolution will also set up a procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear programme which will monitor and approve on case-by-case basis the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related dual-use materials and technology. How will this work in practice? Reports on the UN website by the UN Panel of Experts on Iran established pursuant to resolution 1929 (2010) show that the great majority of items intercepted on route to Iran’s nuclear activities in recent years have been below-threshold items. How will monitoring of such items by the procurement channel monitor take place? Will Iran permit access by the IAEA to related end-users under the Additional Protocol?
The document states that a dispute mechanism will be established to resolve disagreements about performance of commitments. How will this work in practice? Would a new body be set up or would existing bodies such as the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and/or the UN Panel on Iran be involved? The resource implications for either would be significant.
The document also states that if an issue of significant non-performance with JCPoA commitments cannot be resolved through the dispute mechanism then “all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed’? But how in practice could this be achieved? Can appropriate mechanisms be built into the new UN resolution (above)? Much otherwise will depend on future P5 unanimity on Iran.

Project Alpha in The Diplomat: Dual-use illicit trade in Southeast Asia

2015-01-22T00:00:00+00:00

View image | gettyimages.com

The article can be accessed here.

New Alpha case study: The illicit trade network of Daniel Frosch

2015-01-05T00:00:00+00:00

This Alpha case study provides new analysis of Daniel Frosch's activities, and tracks the attempts of authorities in at least five countries to bring an end to his alleged role in supporting Iran's proliferation-related programmes.

The case study can be downloaded at the link below.

20150105_-_Daniel_Frosch_case_study_-_Project_Alpha.pdf